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Statement of Jurisdiction 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3 (1953), as amended. 
Issues Presented 
Whether there was a search and seizure which violated Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when 
police officers entered a home without a warrant in order to investigate a misdemeanor 
violation? 
Whether subsequent evidence and admissions should be suppressed if 
discovered shortly after an illegal search and seizure? 
Pertinent Constitutional Provisions 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
4th Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Statement of the Case 
On January 1, 1993, a two car accident occurred in Orem. Trial transcript, p. 
4. One of the cars, a full-size, brown Buick left the scene of the accident. Id The 
police were notified and an officer Denton Johnston shortly arrived at the scene. 
Suppression hearing transcript, p. 10. Officer Johnston radioed a request for other 
units to begin looking for the missing automobile "due to the time delay." Suppression 
hearing transcript, p. 11. Officer Steele was in the area and he eventually located a 
vehicle matching the description and plate number given to him by Johnston and the 
others involved in the accident. The vehicle was parked near an apartment complex. 
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Suppression hearing transcript, p. 13-14. Officer Steele examined the vehicle and 
noticed the damage to the front of the car that matched the accident scene he had driven 
past. Suppression hearing transcript, p. 14. The officer claimed that the door was not 
closed tightly and that he could detect the smell of alcohol coming from the interior of 
the vehicle. Suppression Hearing, p. 14. 
Officer Steele did not know which apartment unit the owner of the vehicle lived 
in, so he knocked on a door and asked the young lady that answered who owned the 
damaged vehicle. Id He was told she lived in a downstairs unit and Officer Steele 
knocked on the door of that unit. The apartment unit was dark and Officer Steele did 
not receive any response to his knocking on the door. Suppression hearing transcript, 
p. 15. After giving up on a response, Officer Steele found a purse on the stairs leading 
to the door which he confiscated to protect it. Id Officer Steele proceeded to search 
the purse. Id 
At this point, Officer Jackson arrived on the scene and the two officers returned 
to the apartment door. Suppression hearing transcript, p. 16. Officer Jackson reached 
through a tear in the screen door and knocked on the actual apartment door. 
Suppression hearing transcript, p. 16, 26. Again, there was no response, but the 
interior apartment door swung open a few inches. Id The oficers observed that keys 
were left inserted in the apartment door. Id 
The officers then pushed the door open even further and then turned on 
flashlights to illuminate the interior of the apartment. Suppression hearing transcript, p. 
17, 26-27. The police saw a person sit up from a prone position in a back bedroom 
and asked her for her name. After a response, both officers entered the house. 
Suppression hearing transcript, p. 21. After entering the house, the officers began 
asking the appellant questions. Suppression hearing transcript, p. 22. The officers 
then asked the appellant to leave the apartment and the interrogation continued outside. 
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Suppression hearing transcript, p. 18. Thereafter, the appellant was taken to the police 
station to take an intoxilyzer test and to receive her Miranda rights. Trial transcript, p. 
23-24. 
Summary of the Arguments 
Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of Utah protects individuals from 
unreasonable searches. Utah Courts have held this section of the Constitution to 
require a warrant for a search of a home unless exigent circumstances prevent the police 
from obtaining a warrant. In the present case, possible exceptions include hot pursuit, 
destruction of evidence or injury to the appellant. Each of these exceptions fail and 
therefore an unlawful search occurred when the police entered the appellants home 
without a warrant and without an exigent circumstance to support the entry. 
The remedy for a constitutional violation of article I, section 14 is the 
suppression of evidence obtained by the unlawful act that is not too attenuated from the 
wrongful police activity. Here, the trial court failed to suppress evidence obtained 
during the illegal search. Therefore, the court erred in failing to suppress this evidence, 
and the appellate court should reverse and remand this decision for a new trial without 
the illegally obtained evidence. 
Argument 
On January 1, 1993, Orem City Police were engaged in a search for a vehicle 
involved in an accident on a snowy day. Police Officer Terry Steele found the 
automobile parked outside of an apartment complex. Following a brief investigation, 
officer Steele, now accompanied by Police Officer Jackson, entered one of the 
apartments without a warrant and without consent. The actions by these officers were a 
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violation of the appellant's constitutional rights. The remedy for these violations 
should be the suppression of the evidence garnered from the officer's illegal actions. 
A. THE POLICE VIOLATED ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF 
THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION OR THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION BY MAKING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH OF 
A HOME WITHOUT A WARRANT. 
Recently, the Utah appellate Courts have focused on the importance of "relying 
on an analysis of the search and seizure provisions of their own constitutions to expand 
or maintain constitutional protection beyond the scope mandated by the fourth 
amendment." State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 465 (Utah 1990). This new emphasis 
on the Utah State Constitution has focused the analysis for violations of this provision 
on the State Constitution in preference to the United States Constitution. While section 
14 and the Fourth Amendment are similar in nature and have historically been treated in 
a similar manner, Larocco and other recent cases have altered the analysis for a Article I 
Section 14 violation to a standard which is in many ways more strict and certainly more 
understandable than the Federal counterpart. 
Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of Utah reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
This section forbids unreasonable searches. Therefore, the a constitutional violation 
has occurred where there is a search without a warrant and no reasonable exception 
exists for exigent circumstances. 
1. A search took place when the police opened the door to the apartment. 
4 
In order for the police to have violated the appellant's constitutional rights, a 
search must have occurred. In State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the opening of an unlocked car door constituted a search 
by the police . In support of this decision, the Court cited New York v. Class. 475 
U.S. 106, 114-15 (1986). In Larocco. 794 P.2d at 471, this reasoning was extended 
to apply to the Constitution of Utah. Therefore, under the Federal Constitution or the 
State Constitution, the police engage in a search by opening a car door. 
In the present case, the police slightly opened the door by knocking. While this 
could be a search, a search definitely occurred when the police opened the door even 
further and illuminated an interior room with a flashlight. Thereafter, the police actually 
entered the home without a warrant and without consent or exigent circumstances. 
Entry into the home is the chief evil against which the search and seizure clause is 
directed. Payton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). If opening a car door 
constitutes a search, opening the door to a home should be afforded the same 
protection. Nevertheless, when the police entered the home a search occurred, and a 
warrantless entry was made into the home. Therefore, a search occurred without a 
warrant. 
2. Warrantless searches are not permitted unless there are exigent 
circumstances. 
According to Larocco. "warrantless searches will be permitted only where they 
satisfy their traditional justification, namely to protect the safety of police or the public 
or to prevent the destruction of evidence." Larocco. 794 P.2d at 469-70; see also 
Chimel v. California. 394 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). Furthermore, "Warrantless 
searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances require 
action before a warrant can be obtained." Larocco. 794 P.2d at 470; State v. 
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Christensen. 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984). The state carries the burden of showing 
that a warrantless search was lawful. Id 
The presumption that a warrantless search is unreasonable is particularly 
difficult to overcome when the search is conducted in the defendant's home and where 
a warrant can easily and quickly be obtained by the use of Utah's telephonic warrant 
statute. In State v. Ramirez. 814 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah App. 1991), the Court of 
Appeals held the burden is on the state to show both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances. It seems apparent that the police had probable cause that an offense had 
occurred at the time they reached the appellant's apartment for the hit-and-run offense. 
Therefore, the appellant will focus her argument on whether exigent circumstances 
existed to justify a warrantless entry. 
Exigency exists which would justify a warrantless arrest in four different 
circumstances. Utah Code Ann. section 77-7-2 (1990) states that when reasonable 
cause exists, the police may make a warrantless arrest when there is reasonable cause to 
believe that the person may flee, conceal evidence or injure another person. Another 
exception exists when the police are in hot pursuit. Ramirez. 814 P.2d at 1134. 
Importantly, application of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is 
probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in this 
case, has been committed." Welsh v. Wisconsin. 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984). The 
state can not possibly meet its burden as to any of these exceptions. Therefore, an 
illegal search, seizure or arrest has occurred. 
There is absolutely no evidence that the appellant would flee or injure anyone. 
The appellant was at her home in her bed at the time the police made their illegal entry. 
The police had located their suspect and had time to obtain a warrant when the appellant 
did not answer the door, particularly when a telephonic warrant could have been 
6 
obtained in minutes. Therefore, the only exceptions that have any merit at all are 
concealing or destroying evidence and hot pursuit. 
In Ramirez, the Court defined hot pursuit as an "immediate and continuous 
pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of the crime." State v. Ramirez. 814 P.2d at 
1134 citing Welsh v. Wisconsin. 466 U.S. 740, 750-53 (1984). Here, the police did 
not immediately follow the suspect. The police were not present when the crime 
occurred, and the appellant was not continuously pursued from the scene. In fact, there 
is absolutely no evidence to show that the appellant even knew the police were looking 
for her. This is clearly not a hot pursuit case, and this exception to the warrant case is 
inapplicable. 
The only remaining exigent circumstance is concealment or destruction of 
evidence. At the time of the warrantless entry, the police had already examined the 
vehicle involved in the crash. The only other evidence possible would be a blood 
alcohol level if the police had probable cause to suspect driving under the influence, or, 
possibly an injury to the driver. However, several jurisdictions and the United States 
Supreme Court have held that these are not sufficient exigent circumstances to 
constitute an emergency even under the lower standard of the fourth amendment. 
In State v. Geisler. 222 Conn. 672, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), police located a hit 
and run driver at his home. The car door was ajar and the keys were in the 
automobile's ignition. A screen door to the home was closed, but the inner door was 
open. The police entered the home, found the defendant in his bed, and awoke him for 
questioning. The police entered the home under the stated reason of possible injury. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court held the trial court's factual findings "do not support 
the conclusion that it was reasonable to believe that an emergency existed." In the 
present case, the facts available to the police officers were minor damage to the car, the 
key left in the ignition, the open car door and lack of response when the officers rang 
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the doorbell, knocked on the door and windows and shouted through the screen." Id 
at 1236. The facts precisely follow the facts in the instant case. 
Connecticut is not alone in so holding. In People v. Krueger. 208 111. App. 3d 
897, 567 N.E.2d 717 (1991), the court held that a warrantless entry could not be 
justified where the police knew that the defendant had been involved in an accident. In 
Lambert v. State. 745 P.2d 1185 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), the emergency doctrine 
could not be used to support a warrantless entry even where the trial court found severe 
damage to the automobile involved in an accident. 
The Connecticut Court continued in its analysis to state that "even if the police 
had been justified in initially entering the defendant's home, once they ascertained that 
he was physically well, they should have withdrawn. Geisler. 610 A.2d at 1237. In 
this case, the police entered the home and did not withdraw. Even if the Court 
determines that the entry was justified because of a possible emergency situation, once 
the appellant indicated she was fine, the police should have withdrawn. The police 
action in this case was improper and a violation of the appellant's constitutional rights. 
As to blood alcohol level, the United States Supreme Court has held that a 
warrantless entry into a home "cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the 
petitioner's blood alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a 
warrant." Welsh. 466 U.S. at 754. Therefore, the police could not enter the home on 
this basis alone even if the mere smell of alcohol eminating from the car created 
probable cause that the driver was engaged in the crime of driving under the influence. 
There is no emergency exception which justifies the warrantless entry into the 
appellant's home. Therefore, the trial court's findings on these matters should be 
reversed. 
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B . THE PROPER REMEDY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATIONS IS EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE WHICH IS 
LINKED TO THE UNLAWFUL CONDUCT AND IS NOT 
TOO ATTENUATED. 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that "exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 14." 
Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472. The rule extends to oral statements as well as physical 
evidence. "The general rule in a criminal proceeding is that statements and other 
evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful warrantless arrest are suppressible if the 
link between the evidence and the unlawful conduct is not too attenuated. I.N.S. v. 
Lopez-Mendoza. 468 U.S. 1039, 1041 (1984) Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 
471 (1963). 
In the instant case, a constitutional violation has occurred. Therefore, the 
evidence obtained by the police should have been suppressed. It was error on the part 
of the trial court not to suppress the evidence obtained by the police in the appellants 
home and her subsequent statements. All of the information obtained at that time 
should be suppressed. 
Conclusion 
The police officers involved in this case violated the appellant's constitutional 
rights by conducting a warrantless search, seizure and arrest without exigent 
circumstances. The remedy for this type of unlawful action is suppression of evidence 
obtained therefrom. The trial court committed reversible error by failing to suppress 
this information. Therefore, the trial court's decision should be reversed and remanded 
for a new trial without the evidence illegally obtained. 
DATED this of August, 1993. 
MicKael J. Petro^-—-
Attorney for Defendant 
wi 
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ADDENDUM 
AJkXW. X , 3 JL*± UONSTTTUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 14, [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
History: Const. 1896. Liquor, search, seizure and forfeiture, 
Cross-References. — Controlled Sub- § 32A-13-103. 
stances Act, search warrants, § 58-37-10. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 





Consent to search. 
—Who may consent. 
Drugs. 
Evidence voluntarily surrendered. 
Exclusionary rule. 
Hair samples. 
Information used to support warrant. 









—Veracity of witness. 
Reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Scope of search. 
Search. 
Search incident to arrest. 
Search warrant. 
—Validity. 
Search without warrant. 
—Delay before search. 
—Propriety. 
Standing to object to search. 
—Stolen vehicle. 
Stopping for criminal investigation. 
Cited. 
In general. 
Neither under a subpoena duces tecum nor 
under a motion to examine will an examina-
tion be permitted of a nature to contravene 
provision against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Evans v. Evans, 98 Utah 189, 98 P.2d 
703 (1940). 
It is generally recognized that the legitimate 
use of a search warrant is restricted to public 
prosecutions, and in no event may such pro-
ceeding be invoked for the protection of a mere 
private right. Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 
110 P.2d 355 (1941). 
It is use to which it is put that renders prop-
erty, otherwise lawful and rightful to have, use 
and possess, subject to seizure and forfeiture. 
Hemenway & Moser Co. v. Funk, 100 Utah 72, 
106 P.2d 779 (1940). 
For general discussion of fourth amendment 
to federal Constitution, see City of Price v. 
Jaynes, 113 Utah 89, 191 P.2d 606 (1948). 
Whether a search and seizure is reasonable 
is to be determined by the trial court, and evi-
dence in plain view of the officer pursuing a 
felon may be rightfully seized and such seizure 
is not a violation of the federal constitutional 
protection as set forth in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 
(1961). State v. Allred, 16 Utah 41, 395 P.2d 
535 (1964). 
No illegal search and seizure occurred where 
police went to defendant's apartment pursuant 
to a tip, were voluntarily admitted by another 
defendant, saw articles taken in burglary in 
plain sight on kitchen table and were shown 
other stolen merchandise willingly by defen-
dant. State v. Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73, 513 P.2d 
435 (1973). 
Where, although investigation was in its 
preliminary stages, police officers realized 
there was a possibility that defendant had com-
mitted rape and homicide that they were inves-
tigating, and feared that he might try to escape 
or obtain a weapon if he got out of their sight; 
their conduct in accompanying him into his 
bedroom while he finished dressing and in ob-
serving shirt with long strands of hair resem-
bling that of the victim which shirt and hair 
were in plain sight, did not constitute an un-
reasonable search and seizure, nor was taking 
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77-7-2 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed 
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person 
may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another 
person. 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-2, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1985, ch. 192, § 1; 1986, ch. 
161, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, effective March 17, 1986, deleted "other 
than offenses under Title 41 where any non-ju-
risdictional element of the offense is" preced-
ing "committed or attempted" in Subsection 
(1). 
Cross-References. — Children, grounds for 
taking into custody, § 78-3a-29. 
City police officers' arrest powers, 
§§ 10-3-914, 10-3-915, 10-3-919. 
Conservation officers' authority, §§ 23-20-1, 
23-20-1.5. 
ANALYSIS 
Arrest without warrant. 
—Misdemeanor. 





Seizure of goods in making arrest. 
Cited. 
Arrest without warrant. 
Police officers were authorized to make a 
warrantless arrest of defendant for violation of 
parole occasioned by association with known 
felons and attempted flight to avoid arrest 
where the officers had been notified by a reli-
able informant of the location of a house trailer 
containing an escaped prison convict and other 
parolees, defendant was identified as a parolee 
by an officer at the scene and was observed to 
make several trips into the trailer, and when 
the officers ordered the occupants of the trailer 
to surrender, the defendant came out, sounded 
the horn on his automobile in an attempt to 
alert the other occupants of the trailer, and 
attempted to drive away. State v. Kent, 665 
P.2d 1317 (Utah 1983). 
Officers had probable cause to arrest based 
on controlled buys of narcotics which had been 
conducted prior to the search. State v. Banks, 
720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986). 
Force which peace officer may use in making 
arrest, §§ 76-2-404, 77-7-7. 
Highway patrol, arrest power, § 27-10-5. 
Livestock brand inspectors' powers, 
§ 4-24-28. 
Motor Carrier Act, arrests to enforce, 
§§ 54-6-44, 54-6-45. 
Sheriffs power to arrest, §§ 17-22-2(l)(b). 
Special police, arrest power on specified 
property, §§ 67-12-4, 67-12-13. 
Traffic rules and regulations, arrest for vio-
lation, § 41-6-169. 
Water law, arrest powers of state engineer 
and water commissioners, § 73-2-9. 
Weights and measures, arrest powers of de-
partment, § 4-9-7. 
—Misdemeanor . 
Officer could not legally make arrest without 
warrant for "good cause" in misdemeanor cases 
unless offense was committed or attempted in 
his presence, and arrest was made immedi-
ately or within reasonable time thereafter. 
Oleson v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P.23 
(1926). 
Plea of guilty to misdemeanor did not legal-
ize unlawful arrest without warrant nor bar 
action against arresting officer for false impris-
onment, if offense was not committed in offi-
cer's presence or arrest was not made immedi-
ately or within reasonable time. Oleson v. 
Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23 (1926). 
Authority to sign complaint. 
District judge imprqperly dismissed com-
plaint signed by officer other than arresting 
officer since this section deals only with the 
subject of making arrest and not with filing of 
complaints and is not, therefore, authority for 
proposition that only arresting officer has au-
thority to sign complaint. Salt Lake City v. 
Hanson, 19 Utah 2d 32, 425 P.2d 773 (1967). 
False impr isonment . 
If a sheriff in making an arrest was not able 
to justify the same under some of the provi-
sions of this section, it was false and unlawful, 
and he was liable in a civil action for false im-
prisonment. Johnson v. Leigh, 74 Utah 286, 
279 P. 501 (1929). 
A peace officer would not necessarily be held 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
452 
ARREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE 77-7-2 
Section Section 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 77-7-20. 
question suspect — Grounds. 
77-7-16. Authority of peace officer to frisk 
suspect for dangeTous weapon — 77-7-21. 
Grounds. 
77-7-17. Authority of peace officer to take 
possession of weapons. 77-7-22. 
77-7-18. Citation on misdemeanor or infrac- 77-7-23. 
tion charge. 
77-7-19. Appearance before magistrate — 
Failure to appear — Transfer of 
cases — Motor vehicle violations. 
Service of citation on defendant — 
Filing in court — Contents of cita-
tions. 
Proceeding on citation — Voluntary 
forfeiture of bail — Information, 
when required. 
Failure to appear as misdemeanor. 
Delivery of prisoner arrested with-
out warrant to magistrate — 
Transfer to court with jurisdiction 
— Violation as misdemeanor. 
77-7-1. "Arrest" defined — Restraint allowed. 
An arrest is an actual restraint of the person arrested or submission to 
custody. The person shall not be subjected to any more restraint than is neces-
sary for his arrest and detention. 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-1, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
Cross-References. — Legislators privileged 
from arrest, exceptions, Utah Const. Art. VI, 
§ 8. 
National Guard members privileged from ar-
rest at certain times, exceptions, § 39-1-54. 
State guard, exemption from arrest while on 
duty, exceptions, § 39-4-12. 
Unlawful detention a misdemeanor, 
§ 76-5-304. 
Voters privileged from arrest on election 
day, exceptions, Utah Const. Art. IV, § 3. 
Witnesses obeying summons not subject to 
arrest, § 77-21-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
What constitutes "arrest." 
An arrest could not be made without the 
presence of an intention on the part of the ar-
resting officer to make the arrest; notice of ar-
rest should have been given, either expressly 
or by implication, and without such notice no 
amount of physical restraint could constitute 
an arrest. State v. Beckendorf, 79 Utah 360,10 
P.2d 1073 (1932). 
An arrest must have been made in the man-
ner authorized by law. Wright v. Lee, 104 Utah 
90, 138 P2d 246 (1943). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Comment, Arrest 
Record Expungement — A Function of the 
Criminal Court, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 381. 
Note: Detention, Arrest, and Salt Lake City 
Police Practices, 9 Utah L. Rev. 593. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 1 et 
seq. 
C.J.S. — 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 1 et seq. 
Key Numbers . — Arrest «=» 1 et seq. 
77-7-2. By peace officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, 
without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of 
any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any 
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical 
sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been commit-
ted and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has 
committed it; 
451 
HENRIE, KARI B CASE NO: 935000053 PAGE 2 
DOCKET INFORMATION; 
Chrg: DUI 
Chrg: HIT&RUN DAMAGE 
Sentence: 
Deft present with Counse 
ATD: PETRO, MICHAEL 
Tape: 931186 Count: 
; Joseph I. Dimick 
DUI 
Fine Amount: 
Jail: 180 DAYS 
HIT&RUN DAMAGE 
Fine Amount: 
Jail: 180 DAYS 
ALL PARTIES PRESENT. TRIAL 
ON BOTH COUNTS. FINE OF $10 




Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Be 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Be 
1, Prosecutor present 
PRO: BERKOVICH, EDWARD 
4577 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Be 
1000.00 Suspended: .00 
Suspended: 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Be 
1000.00 Suspended: .00 
Suspended: 
HELD AND DEF FOUND GUILTY AS CHARGED 
00 AND 180 DAYS ON EACH .COUNT STAYED 
JUDGE 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS ^ih£!I&£z<;& V 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. *-«'«iii*' 
* U « , / ^ • \ -
STATEQFUTAH ) 
• eg 
U7*H COUNTY j 
f W * Utah County. On** Oapwtaa* *> 
« « r onto*. As such otart <«**» — h^a-
and «eal»f said court. ^ ^ 
Th*_^2 <*•", of JL&L^ i g j g 
9v, 
- ^ o f J & f c l * - , 19.23 
Orem Dept. - 4th Circuit Court 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF OREM CITY JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS (COMMITMENT) 
HENRIE, KARI B CASE NO: 935000053 
1000 N 185 W DOB: 02/27/62 
OREM UT 84057 TAPE: 931186COUNT: 4577 
DATE: 05/24/93 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 41-6-44 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Bench 
Fine: 1000.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 180 DA Susp: 0 ACS: 0 
Charge: 41-6-30 FAIL TO REMAIN SCENE OF ACC-DAMAGE 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Bench 
Fine: 1000.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 180 DA Susp: 0 ACS: 0 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS: 
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
Fine Description: Surcharge - 85% 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
Fine Description: Surcharge - 35% 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS: 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 





1 , 2 8 1 . 3 0 
4 5 9 . 4 5 
2 5 9 . 2 5 
2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
